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A Faith Divided
Will Sunni-Shia war engulf the new Middle East?
BY MASOOD FARIVAR
August 22, 2006
As violence rages in Iraq, it has become ever more
difficult to make sense of it all. Undoubtedly some is the work of
terrorists bent on disrupting the democratic process, some the work of
Sunnis and Baathists angry at their loss of power. But to Vali Nasr, author
of "The Shia Revival," most of the current violence is part of a broad
sectarian conflict. The fall of Saddam Hussein, he argues, has indeed given
birth to a "new Middle East"--but not yet the one hoped for. We are now
seeing the Shia of Islam, newly empowered in Iraq and ever more militant in
Iran, challenge the Sunnis--Islam's dominant sect--in a conflict that will
take years to resolve, if not decades.
Like many modern-day sectarian rifts, this one predates the modern era--in
this case, by well more than a millennium. In the succession crisis that
followed the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632, the majority of Muslims
elected as caliph one of the Prophet's closest companions. A minority
dissented, arguing that the Prophet had passed the leadership of his
community to Ali, his cousin and son-in-law. The dissenters became known as
"Shiat-Ali," or Partisans of Ali. The followers of Muhammad's "Sunna," or
tradition, became known as Sunnis. In time, each side developed what Mr.
Nasr calls a distinct "ethos of faith and piety."
The Shia got their wish when Ali became the fourth caliph, but the pivotal
moment in Shia history came in 680 when Ali's son Hussein and 72 of his
followers were massacred in the desert of southern Iraq after challenging
the authority of Islam's sixth caliph. For the Shia, Hussein came to
symbolize resistance to tyranny; his martyrdom is commemorated to this day
as a central act of Shia piety.
With the exception of a few short-lived Shia dynasties (Iraq is not the
first Shia Arab state), the Shia never really wielded political power,
living mostly as a marginalized minority under Sunni rule. This historical
experience, Mr. Nasr observes, has long imbued the Sunnis with a sense of
"worldly success," and a presumption of mastery, while furnishing the Shia
underdogs with a narrative of "martyrdom, persecution, and suffering."
Mr. Nasr uses this history to explain why Iraq's Shia so eagerly embraced
the fall of Saddam Hussein. Whereas the Americans saw regime change in Iraq
as a harbinger of democracy, Iraq's Shia viewed it primarily as the end to
centuries of Sunni domination. And Saddam's fall inevitably stirred hopes
for a Shia revival elsewhere. The mantra "one man, one vote" has
reverberated among the politically marginalized Shia of Saudi Arabia,
Bahrain and Lebanon, where Hezbollah's TV station has recited democracy's
shibboleths as part of its own campaign to win a larger political role.
All this agitation has alarmed the region's Sunni leaders, Mr. Nasr
observes, and not just the Sunni fundamentalists. King Abdullah of Jordan
has warned about the emergence of a "Shia crescent" slicing across the
region; Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak has questioned the Shia's Arab
loyalties. Certainly both Egypt and Jordan--and many other nations in the
region--have reason to be concerned about the rise of a Shia-dominated Iraq
allying with Iran, the Mideast's other Shia powerhouse.
Mr. Nasr is at his best when he explains the historical ties among Shia, not
least among Shia in Iran and Iraq. It was thought, before the invasion of
Iraq in 2003, that a new Iraq would turn away from Iran because of the
profound cultural differences between Arabs and Persians and because of
their widely different historical experience. It is true that Iraq is
unlikely to follow Iran's theocratic model--Iraq's Grand Ayatollah Ali
Sistani is the follower of the most vocal clerical critic of the late
Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of Iran's current theocracy. But ties
between the Shia of Iran and Iraq have grown stronger since the invasion,
Mr. Nasr notes, and Tehran, he believes, holds the key to stability in Iraq.
Thus Mr. Nasr urges the U.S. to normalize its relations with Iran, despite
the heated rhetoric of recent months and quarrels over the intent of Iran's
nuclear program.
It must be said that Mr. Nasr supports his arguments by over-citing
extremists on both sides of the sectarian divide. There is no doubt that
such extremists play a role, intensifying the crisis and propelling the
violence. But such an approach, on Mr. Nasr's part, has the effect of
playing down unfairly the many moderate participants in these debates who
aim at reconciliation and who respect the normal give-and-take of politics.
In short, the Sunni-Shia divide does not yet even begin to approach the
division, within Christianity, that incited the long and bloody Wars of
Religion in the 16th and 17th centuries.
More important, Mr. Nasr minimizes a reality at odds with his thesis:
Religious extremism and anti-Americanism cut across sectarian lines. The
strategic alliance directed at the U.S.--Iran, Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas--is
half Sunni and half Shia. What is more, the region's other great
powers--Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria--are overwhelmingly Sunni. Thus if the
Shia are to gain rights in these countries, they are going to have to do so
as citizens of each rather than as members of a pan-Shia movement.
Mr. Nasr urges the Bush administration to engage the region's Shia before it
worries about the spread of democracy. But it was democracy that brought the
Shia to power, and it will be democracy that will redress their
centuries-old sense of injustice.
Mr. Farivar is a reporter for Dow Jones Newswires. ~ Copyright © 2006 Dow
Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
SOURCE:
Dow Jones & Company, Inc.
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